This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set from Constanta (a Georgian micro-lender), we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation where better-risk borrowers team up with better-risk borrowers before the loan contract is concluded. After the loan disbursement, parts of the incentive system lead to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100%, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term problems of the joint-liability lending mechanism, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably.
Introduction
Until recently, poor persons demanding micro loans which they need to make small investments for their self-employment opportunities, were mostly excluded from the access to credit market. As a consequence, due to the lack of financial resources, they were either unable to be self-employed, or, if they had started their own business, suffered from under-financing and were not able to expand their business to a size sufficient to generate incomes above the poverty line. On a macro-level, the lack of financial capital for small and micro businesses has been a major obstacle to the small-scale private sector not only in developing, but also in transition and, to a smaller extent, in industrialized economies.
The reasons for the exclusion contain a risk and a cost component: 1) All persons without the usual collateral were unable to signal their risk type and their creditworthiness so that traditional banks which usually secure loans by collateral, are unable to assess their risk. 2) Given that persons running a micro-business mostly ask for rather small loan sizes, it is not feasible in the usual banking system to substitute the additional screening and monitoring efforts for collateral. The added cost then surpasses the potential revenues and, thus, most institutional lenders using conventional financial technologies consider the disbursement of micro and small credits highly inefficient.
During the last three decades, major progress in this sector has been made. The proponents of the so-called micro-finance paradigm showed that the problems can be addressed by creating and implementing new micro-lending technologies. These proved to work quite efficiently in many transition and developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, and even in some industrialized countries, by giving access to credit to those persons who now became able to signal their creditworthiness at low cost.
The main progress of the Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) is that they have developed mechanisms where borrowers form groups which jointly share liability for loan delinquencies or default. These peer groups can be seen as a substitute for "conventional" collateral where the incentives set by such contracts enable the lender to reduce his cost of screening, monitoring and enforcing loan contracts. 2 In the meantime, many variations based on the peer group mechanism have been developed drawing not only on the creativity of the MFIs but also on each country's institutional setting. 3 Nevertheless, all mechanisms have in common that there is not one single variable (such as collateral) but a 2 It has to be emphasized that besides the group lending schemes that have almost completely dropped the collateral requirement -there is a second type of contract also used by MFIs, namely the individual microlending contract (cf. Armendariz and Morduch [2000] ) which combines the traditional "collateral-based" technology with new elements. The present paper will deal exclusively with group contracts. (For an empirical discussion of the key factors of individual lending schemes, see Vigenina and Kritikos [in press ].) 3 In particular, the extent to which a certain kind of liability between the members of a peer group can be enforced by the lender depends on the legal setting and the degree of legal enforcement.
combined set of incentives, as the limited or unlimited liability of each borrower for all other borrowers of the group, the repeated (group) access to further loans if previous ones have been repaid by all group members and the dynamic incentives of increasing loans.
Recent theoretical research (for an excellent overview, cf. Morduch [1999a] ) has explained that high repayment rates are more likely if the groups are able to self-select in homogenous groups of low risks and if the mechanism induces sufficient peer monitoring, peer pressure to repay in a timely manner, peer support, in terms of guaranteeing one another's payments, and enforcement of the agreement among borrowing group members. At the same time, there have been some doubts as to whether the mechanism is functioning as advertised in these models (cf. e.g. Jain [1996] ) and whether other factors, in particular the strong enforcement process implemented by the loan officers, which is not considered in the models, might be the real reason for the MFIs' success.
Evidence from the field shows that group contracts sometimes work perfectly leading to repayment rates of slightly less than 100%. Sometimes repayment rates dropped to less than 30%, leading to a speedy breakdown of the corresponding MFI. Positive examples were demonstrated at Fundusz Micro (Poland), at BancoSol (Bolivia), at Constanta (Georgia) and last but not least at the trend setting Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), 4 even though there is lot of discussion regarding the repayment rates of the latter institution (see Morduch [1999b] and Woolcock [1999] ). Negative examples were observed in Albania, Malaysia, India and several African countries. The experience from the breakdowns revealed that several prerequisites have to be fulfilled to induce high repayment rates: a) the focus on the target group -mostly borrowers who have no access to the regular banking system should be accepted, otherwise the non-refinancing threat will not be meaningful; b) the deliberate grouping by its eventual members and not by the loan officers to ensure mutual responsibility for the joint-liability; c) the restriction of the group size; and d) the enforcement of the group liability mechanism -exclusion from access to further loans must be made real to the complete group if it fails to repay all loans. 5 However, there is much less evidence which incentives now induce loan repayment when these prerequisites are met. Therefore, this paper examines what factors improve and what factors have no measurable or even a counterproductive effect on loan repayment.
Furthermore, the paper analyzes to what extent the theoretically predicted multi-stage process between borrowers takes place, and to what extent other actions of the loan officers or of the borrowers secure the loan repayment. The data used for testing the impact of all components was obtained through questionnaires given to 108 borrowing groups and was completed in cooperation with the MFI "Constanta" at its branch in Batumi, Georgia during the winter term of 2001/2002.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the group-lending methodology of Constanta and, where necessary, relates it to other typical group-lending organizations. In section three, a brief review is given of the theoretical and empirical literature on peer group-lending mechanisms to the extent that is relevant for the research of the present paper. In section four, the empirical results are presented, showing which of the theoretical propositions on the joint-liability approach hold and which other factors influence the repayment behavior. Section five concludes and derives some policy recommendations in light of the empirical results, unfolding that the main problems of the joint-liability approach, the mismatching problem and the domino effect can be addressed by sufficiently restricting the long-term dynamic incentives.
GROUP LENDING AT THE MFI CONSTANTA IN GEORGIA
The Lending Methodology: In October 1997, Constanta started providing micro-loans to solidarity groups with no collateral requirements, thus targeting mostly poor microentrepreneurs. The lending technology consists of repeated loans that have a maximum term of 4 months and must be repaid in weekly installments. Loans are granted to groups of 7 to 15 clients. Group members guarantee each others' loans, and all of the group's loans must be repaid on time in order to have access to subsequent loans. The initial loan size is 100 to 200 Georgian Lari (GEL) (i.e. 50 -100 Euro). Loans increase in each cycle by not more than 50% of the previous loan amount. For example, each person in a group of 7 borrowers may start with a loan of 100 GEL. After 4 months, each borrower may have access to a loan of up to 150 GEL if all group members have repaid their loan. However, since the next loan actually disbursed depends on the business needs and reported cash flow of each borrower the observed average increase is only 15 to 30%. The MFI charges an administration fee of 1% of the disbursed amount and an interest rate of 4% (flat) per month. For a loan of 100 GEL, with a loan term of 4 months, and an interest rate of 4 percent per month the total interest payment would be 16 GEL (4% x 100 x 4). The total amount of 116 GEL should be repaid in weekly installments of 7.25 GEL each (116/16 weeks). Since the borrower has to pay 1 GEL as administration fee, a 100 GEL loan costs the borrower a total of 17 GEL for 4 months. Eligible to borrow from Constanta are persons who are over 18 years old, have started their business and possess at least six months of working experience. 6 The Lending Procedure and Enforcement Measures: Clients form their groups deliberately. No family members are allowed, since earlier experience showed that close relatives were not willing to impose social sanctions on each other. Loan officers do not intervene in the process of group building. When a group has been formed, members meet with a loan officer and attend five training meetings. During this period, the loan officer visits each group member's business to evaluate the borrower's financial situation. The process between first meeting and loan disbursement takes about 2 weeks. After the loan disbursement, there are no further official meetings. To show their presence, loan officers make random visits to their borrowers. Further loans are disbursed (based on a highly standardized procedure) when the entire group has paid back its previous loans and presented its actual financial results.
Payments are considered delinquent if one currency unit is not repaid on time. In case of delinquency 1% of the late payment is demanded as a fine for delay. In addition, after the first late payment, group members are allowed to increase their maximum loan size by only GEL 25 (instead of 50% of the previous loan) in the next loan cycle. The second late payment reduces the amount increase to GEL 15. If there are three or more late payments, the loan size will not increase at all. Using the previous example, if all 7 group members started with a 100 GEL loan, each member's next loan can be increased to 150 GEL if all 7 members paid back on time. For one late repayment, access to the next loan is reduced to 125 GEL for all members, etc. In addition, the delinquent member of the group has to pay 1% of the late installment as an additional fine.
If arrears occur, loan officers become permanently present in the group and exert high pressure on all members of the delinquent group until the complete installment has been collected. In fact, at the branch of Batumi where the questionnaire was conducted, only two groups refused to pay for a delinquent borrower. These groups were excluded from access to further loans and sued. In this context it should be emphasized that the borrowers are also allowed to exclude single members of their group if these proved to be defaulters.
Branch Performance: Constanta operates in the urban areas of Tbilisi, Gori, Batumi, and Marneuli, and lends mainly to traders, food-related businesses and artisans. The visited branch of Batumi has more than 2.000 clients and was in 2002 operationally selfsufficient. The number of clients reached by Constanta's loan officers is approximately 400 per officer which corresponds to the international standards set by BancoSol in Bolivia (for example). The loan officers are offered a performance-based wage comprising, a fixed amount and a bonus contingent on individual performance, calculated by a formula that combines stock, flow indicators and strategic ratios, and which may not exceed 3/5 of the fixed amount.
One success measure of each lending organization is its repayment rate. The repayment rates at the Batumi Branch for the year of 2001, defined as the collection on current amounts due divided by the total current amounts due, was between 98.91% and 99.95%. By the end of 2001 only 1.9% of all active borrowers were delinquent.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Theoretical Models
The theoretical literature on micro-lending addresses the central problem of designing and structuring micro-loan mechanisms in a way that loan repayments may be expected with high probability. This research has been concerned with the behavior of borrowers before and after a loan contract is signed, and has analyzed how the typical problems of a loan contract can be solved by the joint-liability approach as used by Constanta and other MFIs.
Before contracting, any lending organization is confronted with the problem of attracting high risks. Theoretical papers (see Varian [1990] , Ghatak [1999] , Kritikos [1999] , Morduch [1999a] , Van Tassel [1999] , Laffont and N´Guessan [2000] ) show that the incentives derived from the joint-liability mechanism induce similar risk types to group together if and when the borrowers have sufficient information about each other. 7 The reason: any risk type of borrower who aims to maximize his utility will try to keep the probability of default within the group as low as his own default probability. Therefore a low risk type will reject a matching with a high risk type. As a first result of the matching, safe types are teamed with safe types and risky types might be teamed with risky types -an outcome which is subsequently called 'assortative matching'.
Risky types will face higher borrowing cost than safe types although all groups have the same contract charges. Since risky partners are more likely to fail, successful risky types (being in the same group with a failed partner) are more likely to have to pay the jointliability payment. Consequently, due to more failures the additional borrowing cost in the group might become so high, that the expected total return is negative for risky borrowers. It is, then, a secondary result of the mechanism that it pays only for low-risk types to apply for such peer group loans with joint-liability. The problem of adverse selection will, thus, be reduced by a self-selection process where only lower-risk borrowers apply for a loan.
Having signed the contract, moral hazard and negative repayment behavior are the main problems of any lending contract. The analysis of group contracts show that an access to higher loans (dynamic incentives) induces peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure among the borrowers when access is made dependent on the repayment of all borrowers in the group (cf. Stiglitz [1990] , Varian [1990] Kritikos [1999] , Morduch [1999a] ). Threatened with exclusion from further loans if one or more than one of its members is not able to repay (a failure burdening the rest of the group with additional payments), each person will monitor the other members so that investments are undertaken in a profitable way. Further, each person will support the other group members if they face repayment problems they are not responsible for, and each borrower will be put under pressure if he misuses his loan. As a result, the probability of moral hazard is reduced because, by introducing joint-liability contracts, a considerable part of the risk is transferred from the lender to the borrowing group.
Similar reasoning holds for the problem of strategic default when borrowers are able but unwilling to meet their obligations. The lender´s enforcement capacity is created through the termination threat (cf. Besley and Coate [1995] , Armendariz [1999] , Kritikos [1999] ). With joint-liability, if a borrower fails to repay his share of the loan, the whole credit group is considered as being in default loosing access to subsequent loans. Therefore, the group is motivated either to repay for the delinquent partner, or to exert social pressure on him. As a consequence of these incentives, lenders are able to achieve the repayment of all loans with high probability, if the prerequisites a)-d) mentioned in section 1 are met.
The main problem of the joint-liability mechanism also arises from the termination threat. If a group, not able to repay the loan of one defaulting member, is excluded from further loans, we may observe a domino effect. In this case, the group members' best strategy is not to repay their loans either because all members will be excluded irrespective of their individual ability to repay their own loan (cf. Besley and Coate [1995] , Paxton [1996] , Kritikos [1999] ). This outcome is disadvantageous for the MFI (in comparison to an individual lending scheme) because all other group members except the defaulter could have repaid their loans.
From a theoretical point of view, the probability of defection of the complete group can be reduced if the set of mechanisms is designed in such a way that it only pays for low-risk borrowers to apply for a joint-liability loan (as shown earlier in this subsection). In these groups, the probability is low that more than one borrower will be unable to repay, provided that the business correlation of the borrowers is not too high (cf. Kritikos [1999] ). In the case of just one defaulting borrower, however, the MFI can be almost sure that the rest of the group will be able to temporarily cover his installments. 8
The Research Agenda
The empirical literature has only partly examined how these theoretical 
Earlier Empirical Evidence
While there is more theoretical than empirical research on the group lending mechanism, some questions have already been addressed. Wydick [1999] who uses data from a survey of an ACCION International affiliate in western Guatemala, focused his empirical investigations on the impact of different kind of social cohesion on borrowing group performance: social ties, peer monitoring, and peer pressure. In the Guatemalan context, strong social ties proved to have no or, rather, a negative effect on group behavior.
Improvement of the repayment performance was associated mostly with variables used as proxies for peer monitoring and peer pressure. Not necessarily in contradiction to this, Mondal and Tune [1993] emphasize that too weak social ties may also lead to negative outcomes, in the sense that there is no willingness to support the fellow group members.
The findings of Zeller [1998] are different, showing that in rural Madagascar, groups with a higher level of social cohesion had a significantly higher repayment rate. Wenner [1995] used the data from 25 Costa Rican FINCA credit groups to study the validity and cost-effectiveness of group lending as a means to transmit information about borrower creditworthiness. He found that members of groups engaged in formal screening (with an internal code of regulations) had a low probability for delinquency, indicating that screening indeed resulted in an informational efficiency gain, a result which is supported by the parallel research of Zeller [1998] . Based on the model of Besley and Coate [1995] , Paxton [1996] investigated the group dynamics of the MFI "Le Project de Promotion du Petit Credit Rural" in Burkina Faso. The empirical results indicated that urban, homogeneous groups with sufficient training and reliable leaders had the highest probability of repaying their loans. The domino effect (as mentioned in 3.1) proved to significantly influence the loan default rate. Paxton [1996] also found another obstacle, the mismatching problem rarely discussed in theory stating that groups tend to experience repayment difficulties after several loan cycles which they could not foresee during the process of building the group. As loan sizes increase due to the dynamic incentives, preferred loan terms and volumes will differ with the consequence that borrowers with smaller loan volumes will reject joint-liability for borrowers with higher loan volumes in the same group if the latter run into repayment difficulties. Paxton [1996] showed that the probability of loan repayment may decrease if a group runs into the mismatching problem.
Empirical testing of the micro-finance mechanism of Constanta
In this section we present the sampling design, the data and the results of our survey which allows us to test the effectivity of all components of a micro-lending contract. By using a questionnaire, we surveyed 108 randomly selected groups of the Batumi branch of Constanta 9 (24% of the total number of borrowing groups). Two clients rejected to answer.
The questionnaire focuses on the process of group formation, loan repayment and income performance, and on a wide range of potential activities between group members after the loan disbursement (see Appendix A). All questions were close-ended, enabling the borrowers to give precise and unambiguous responses. When necessary, additional explanations were given by the interviewers, so that no serious problems with missing values occurred. To assess the trustfulness of the interviewee's responses and, thus, of the survey instrument we asked the clients whether they would be able to borrow from other official credit institutions in the region. Except for some borrowers of the 5 th and 6 th loan cycle none of them was able to get such access due to their lack of collateral and of any (positive) credit history. 97 interviewees answered truthfully and were included into the sample, which we use to test the hypotheses.
To study the dynamics of the group-lending mechanism, we define several hypotheses which are related to the theoretical results shown in section 3.1. Then we designed an econometric model which replicates the two-stage nature of the principal-agent relation: the mutual screening process before signing the loan contract, and the mutual monitoring and enforcement process after the credit disbursement. The aim of the model is on the one hand to test in what way the theoretical predictions are correct and on the other hand to discover novel empirical relationships beyond existing theories.
Assortative matching (hypothesis 1)
Hypothesis
Starting with the analysis of group formation, we aim to identify what variables influence the process of self-selection. Theoretical models (for formal proofs see inter alia Ghatak [1999] ) argue that the key factor of the group lending scheme is that types similar with respect to their repayment risk will group together. Since our survey instrument allows to control the economic status of the interviewed borrower, we are able to test the theoretical outcome by the following Hypothesis 1: The lower the interviewed borrower's probability for a loan default is, the lower is the risk of the business projects of all peers in his group.
We apply an econometric model, which is constructed so that it captures the most important factors contributing to the self-selection process (equation 1). 10 An ordered logit model was specified to obtain the coefficient estimates.
where j = 1, 2, …, J indicates the ordered categories in the dependent variable.
The model reveals the factors mostly contributing to the ability of an agent to join a group where the default risk of his peers is low. The dependent variable, group quality (GQ), indicates how the borrower evaluated the risk of the business projects of his perspective 10 We are very grateful to one referee for his suggestions on the design of the subsequent analysis. peers at the time the group was formed (a scale ranging from 1-"all businesses were quite risky" to 5-"all businesses were quite safe"). It is an aggregate assessment of the group members' risk characteristics (excluding the interviewed borrower) and can be seen as a proxy for the quality of the group (qu. 5, App. A).
The interdependence between GQ and the first independent variable, borrower's risk type (RT), enables the testing of hypothesis 1. In contrast to group quality, which shows the risk characteristics of the group, RT reflects the risk profile of the interviewed borrower. Since we aimed to avoid a self-assessment of risk attitudes by the interviewed persons, we approximate their risk by the characteristics of their business projects. It is computed as a cluster analysis score using the following three indicators: 1) borrower's average monthly business income measured as an interval that ranges from 1-"up to 100 GEL" to 5-"more than 400 GEL", 2) development of the monthly income after the disbursement of the first loan (1-"decreased substantially" to 5-"increased significantly"), and 3) borrower's own assessment of the stability of his business project (1-"quite unstable" to 5-"very stable").
The borrowers were classified so that the resulting clusters exhibit high internal (withincluster) homogeneity and high external (between-cluster) heterogeneity with respect to the three indicators. At each stage of the analysis the two most similar respondents or clusters of respondents were combined into bigger clusters. The merging was stopped when a large increase in the average within-cluster distance was detected. 11 Three clusters were specified (mean values are shown in table 1). The clusters are most clearly separated by the income level of the borrowers which determines the ability of the entrepreneur to cover his installments, thus lowering the financial risk for the lending institution. We label the borrowers belonging to cluster 1 as "low risk" (24% of the interviewed borrowers), those from cluster 2 as "intermediate risk" (44%), and the rest (cluster 3) as "higher risk" (32%). In this context it should be emphasized that there were no high risks among the borrowers. The label "higher risk" is only used for clear differentiation from the other clusters. Coming back to hypothesis 1, the variables GQ and RT should be correlated if selfselection takes place as expected by theory.
The second independent variable, information (I), indicates how well the borrower knew the business projects of his peers at the time the self-selection took place (from 1-"no information at all" to 5-"detailed information about all projects", qu. 6,). In the theoretical literature on self-selection, it is often assumed that group members have perfect information about each other. If true the estimate of the coefficient should be insignificant.
Variables education (E), credit needs (CN), and relationship (R)
show whether certain personal characteristics help the applicants enter a low-risk group. E (a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent has a university degree and 0 otherwise) stands for higher knowledge and better learning skills (qu. 1). The parameter coefficient should be positive if the assumption holds that higher educated people become better entrepreneurs. CN indicates how much money the interviewed client would have borrowed from Constanta assuming that there were no constraints on the loan size. It is an interval ranging from 1-"up to 500 GEL" to 5-"more than 2.000 GEL" (qu. 8). We expect that agents who claim higher financial needs run businesses with greater potential for development in the long run. R (a nominal variable with a value of 1 if the borrower has relatives among the group members, 2-if the borrower has close friends among the group members, and 3-if the group members are just partners) shows whether kinship or friendship provides any advantages to the applicants in the selection process (qu. 7).
The other exogenous variables test whether the groups of lower risk have internal rules that are stricter than the rules followed by the borrowers from higher risk groups.
Monitoring (M)
indicates the frequency of meetings between group members (from 1-"once a month" to 5-"every day", qu. 9). Peer control (PC) shows how often the borrowers discuss their business problems within the groups (1-"never" to 5-"on a regular basis", qu. 10). Peer pressure (PP) measures the group members' willingness to sanction delinquent partners. It is a latent variable extracted by a factor analysis using the following three highly correlated variables. (The results from the factor analysis are presented in App. B.): (1) pressure the group exerts or would exert on a delinquent member (answers rating from 1-"no pressure" to 5-"extremely strong pressure", qu. 11), (2) sanctions the group imposes or would impose on a delinquent member (from 1-"no sanctions" to 5-"immediate exclusion from the group", qu. 12), and (3) sanctions the MFI imposes or would impose on a defaulting group (from 1-"the group receives further loans but their size does not increase with time" to 5-"all group members are immediately excluded from the lending program", qu. 13).
Empirical Results
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 give us a first overview of the crucial variables. Based on the variability of the variable group quality we divide the respondents into three groups. The variable can take five values, from 1-"all businesses quite risky" to 5-"all businesses quite safe", but in our survey none of the borrowers chose answers (1) or (2) -indicating high risk businesses (see also our comment on the label of the clusters).
At first glance, this outcome raises the question of biased answers. However, there are good reasons to reject such conjecture. Firstly, as mentioned, the variable group quality is not a self-report of the risk-characteristics of the interviewed borrower, but an aggregate evaluation of the other group members. Secondly, the mere fact that there were almost no defaulting borrowers corresponds to the interviewee's assessment that his peers are not running any high-risk business. We will return to this conjecture when discussing result 1.
-insert Table 2 about hereExamining the mean values of the variables listed in the table we can conclude that lowrisk borrowers build "best quality" groups. They have higher education, higher financial needs, and base their selection decisions on detailed information about the businesses of the other members. These groups have stricter selection rules and are less likely to accept relatives and friends. After the loan disbursement their members do not exchange much information between each other but if necessary exert strong pressure on delinquent peers.
We evaluate the efficiency of the self-selection process by applying the specified econometric model to the empirical data. The results are presented in Table 3 . 12 To show the robustness of the estimates, tests of restricted models which include only the significant variables, are provided. The coefficients of the tested variables in these models exhibit values similar to those in the main model.
-insert Table 3 about hereBorrower's risk type (RT) and information (I) proved to be the two variables significantly influencing the group quality. Figure 1 illustrates the first part of this finding by showing that the borrowers with lower risk characteristics have chosen partners with more reliable business projects. The significance of the second variable, I, makes clear that borrowers a priori do not dispose all necessary information about their perspective peers as assumed in 12 The ordinal logit model simultaneously estimates multiple equations whose number equals the number of categories in the dependent variable minus one. The model is built on the assumption of parallel regressions. That is, the coefficients for the independent variables in the equations would not vary significantly if they were estimated separately. The model produces estimates of two intercepts and one set of coefficients for each independent variable. In Table 3 we provide a test of parallel lines. The high p-value (.404) implies that the null hypothesis of identical slope coefficients across response categories cannot be rejected.
theory. The other independent variables are statistically insignificant, showing that borrowers' personal characteristics, such as the level of education, and the internal rules in the groups do not substantially influence the process of self-selection. 
Result 1: The group formation is influenced by the two variables Borrower's risk type and
Information. In favor of hypothesis 1, we found that lower risk borrowers, by making use of the local information which is also generated during the selection process and which is only available to them, indeed team up with lower risk borrowers and vice versa.
Result 1 is also fundamental to the further analysis. For that we may return to the business risk of the 'other' borrowers in each group as it is assessed by the interviewed borrower.
As emphasized in section 3.1, theory makes two propositions with respect to assortative matching if the group-lending contract is properly designed. The first proposition that an applicant who beliefs that his perspective peers run unprofitable businesses would not join the group is supported by Result 1. The second proposition that only lower risk borrowers should be attracted to peer group loans (if the MFI aims to realize high repayment rates) is supported by the fact that no borrower evaluated his peers' projects as high risk businesses. Thus, due to the borrowers' self-selection process and due to the fact that almost no default occurred, we may conclude that no high risk businesses were able to build a stable group and to receive a group loan. In this context, it should be emphasized that the main difference between the borrowers who belong to different clusters proved to be their ability to support a delinquent partner, e.g. by covering at least part of his debt (see below Result 5). In the first cluster (low-risk borrowers) only 2.7 percent of the groups experienced external repayment problems, whereas in the second and third clusters (intermediate to higher-risk borrowers) this share rises respectively to 8.6% and 12.5%.
Testing the efficiency of the applied incentive mechanisms (hypothesis 2)
Hypothesis
Turning to the second stage of the lending process, when loans are disbursed and have to be repaid, theory predicts that the group contract sets several direct and indirect incentives which influence the repayment decision of each borrower. As is shown in Besley and Coate [1995] , Kritikos [1999] Armendariz and Morduch [2000] , dynamic incentives and the termination threat employ a direct reason to repay the previous loan. The credible threat to cut off any future loan and the positive incentive of having access to larger or cheaper loans in case of proper repayment already may induce borrowers to repay their loans without any peer measures. However, since borrowers are also jointly reliable and get only group access to future loans, the contract provides borrowers with an indirect incentive for peer monitoring, peer pressure, and peer support inducing borrowers (as formally shown in Stiglitz [1990] , Besley and Coate [1995] or Armendariz [1999] ) to choose investments of low risk and to refrain from strategic default. As a consequence, the lender should not face any moral hazard or enforcement problems. This leads to
Hypothesis 2: The repayment rate will significantly improve if peers (1) monitor each other more intensively; (2) impose stronger social sanctions; (3) show more willingness to provide peer support; and (4) appreciate the opportunity to have access to subsequent loans and (5) to higher loan volumes.
For testing the hypothesis we take into consideration the dynamics of the group-lending mechanisms. When borrowers have to decide whether to contribute their shares of the total amount due they may choose between different strategies. If all group members decide for the same move, contribute or defect, the outcome is straightforward. The group repays or defaults. If the group members chose different moves, they have to go through the second stage of their repayment decision. Those borrowers ready to contribute their shares need to compare the discounted benefits of having access to further loans with the cost of repaying the outstanding loan(s). Accordingly, they have to decide whether to pressure the delinquent partner(s) and force him (them) to repay, or alternatively, to make up for the difference and eventually exclude the defaulters.
In order to capture all aspects of the repayment mechanism and of the decision making two equations are introduced. At the first stage, to be called 'internal repayment performance', the members of the groups decide internally about their repayment without being delinquent and without being put under pressure by the loan officers. At the second stage, to be called 'external repayment performance', the behavior of the members is observed when the repayment was due and when loan officers may put the group under pressure.
Equation (2) reflects the dynamics of the first stage of the repayment decision and shows all major factors that affect the internal repayment performance between members of the credit group. The dependent variable is dichotomous with a value of 1 if there were no cases of internal delinquency in the group and 0 otherwise. To consider the effect of the independent variables, a binary logit model is specified. Notice that, at this stage of the analysis, we do not differentiate between groups which managed to solve their repayment problems without an active involvement of loan officers, and groups which failed to do so.
where ID = 1 if in the surveyed group there was no incidence of internal delinquency.
Equation (3) replicates the second stage of the repayment decision and shows what factors contribute to the mitigation of the enforcement problem in borrowing groups. We aim to find the characteristics distinguishing between groups with external repayment problems from groups with perfect repayment history and groups which experienced internal repayment problems but solved them without violating the repayment schedule. We use a multinominal logit model where the dependent variable can take three values: 1 if there were no repayment problems in the group, 2 if the group had internal repayment problems but solved them, and 3 if there were cases of external delinquency in the group.
where j = 1, 2 refers to the delinquency status of the borrowing groups as described above, and ( )
To (qu. 14) . DI is a factor analysis score (see Append. B) measuring to what extent the borrower values the access to subsequent loans that are (1) of a bigger size, (2) at lower interest rate, (3) with longer terms to maturity, and (4) at lower transaction costs (qu. 15).
The RHS of both equations contains four more variables, which, as shown in section 3.1, are believed to influence the borrower's repayment behavior. The borrower's risk type (RT) in equation (2) and group quality (QG) in equation (3) are expected to be correlated where the internal repayment performance is affected by the individuals' risk and where the external repayment behavior depends on the characteristics of the complete group.
Business correlation (CORR), the next independent variable, shows to what extent the returns of the members' projects are linked to each other, for instance because of mutual trading activities, common clientele, common suppliers, etc. (qu. 17). The degree of interdependence is measured on an ascending scale from 1-"no correlation among members' businesses" to 5-"extremely strong correlation". The statistical characteristics of the variable indicate whether risk diversification matters, in the sense that the more diversified the borrowers' investments, the less the probability that all borrowers face simultaneous repayment problems due to external shocks. 13 Social ties (ST) reflects the degree of homogeneity among the group members with respect to demographic and social characteristics (qu. 18) 14 . Strong social ties between borrowers increase the mutual trust and strengthen the impact of sanctions imposed in case of default. Therefore we expect to find a positive correlation between the variable and the repayment performance of both individual borrowers and groups. The last variable, staff pressure (SP), shows how often the loan officers pay a visit to the group members (1-"less than once a month" to 5-"several times a week"). It is a proxy of the loan officers' monitoring efforts (qu. 16).
The fact that nearly all explanatory variables on the right-hand side of both equations are identical allows us not only to test hypothesis 2, but also to better understand the dynamics of the studied incentive mechanisms. For example, a statistical significance of the coefficient 'peer pressure' in equation (2) would indicate the existence of a strong ex-ante pressure in the group. A statistical significance of this coefficient in equation (3) would reveal a strong ex-post peer pressure among the groups when facing a repayment problem.
Empirical Results
13 For a discussion about the relevance of risk diversification, cf. Krahnen and Schmidt [1994] . A different argument is raised by Armendariz de Aghion [1999] who asserts that a high business correlation would guarantee better (if not excessive) monitoring, which reduces the probability of strategic default. This argument is in contrast to Krahnen and Schmidt [1994] insofar as they expect a lower repayment probability for a high business correlation, while Armendariz de Aghion [1999] expects a higher repayment probability. 14 Question 18 contains 6 short "yes or no" questions. Each positive answer takes a value of 1. The sum over all questions gives the value of the index. For example, if there are only two "yes" responses "social ties"=2.
We start again with providing descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model (Table 4 ). The borrowing groups are classified into three group types according to their delinquency status, with a first group type without repayment problems (column 1), a second group type which was able to solve their repayment problems by applying their internal rules (column 3) and a third group type which was not able to solve its repayment problems alone so that the loan officers were informed (column 4).
The members of the groups with perfect repayment history run more profitable businesses in comparison to the rest of the borrowing groups, feel safe with their peers (a significantly higher share prefers group to individual lending), and do not control each other on a regular basis. In the defaulting groups (column (4)) we observe a stronger preferences to individual lending. The members of these groups are less likely to impose social sanctions on delinquent peers while at the same time we observe a high interdependence across members' business projects.
To better understand these results we examine the estimates from the specified binary and multinominal logit models (Tables 5 and 6 ). The coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates. The parameter significance is evaluated by the Wald statistics.
Internal Repayment Performance
In our sample 24 % of the groups experienced repayment problems. Table 5 shows that there are two variables which significantly influence the internal repayment performance (q. 20): peer support and peer pressure. Internal solutions to the repayment problems were then realized when the borrowers were willing to support or control their delinquent peers.
-insert Table 5 about hereStarting with peer support which takes a value of 1 if ceteris paribus borrowers prefer group to individual lending we found that the group contract was preferred in about 30 percent of the groups. In these groups, by jointly supporting the delinquent partner, all problems of internal delinquency were solved, even without informing the staff (simply because the repayment schedule was met). In comparison, in groups whose members prefer individual lending, in only 60% of the cases with internal repayment problems the group managed to repay the entire debt on time. Most of them did it by imposing sanctions on the defaulting member and eventually forcing him to repay, whereas only a minority solved the problem by making up the difference.
For those 30% of the borrowers who prefer the group-lending to the individual lending scheme, the main reason to do so was the confidence in the group's willingness to provide mutual help either by temporarily covering repayment obligations or by offering labor support. 15 Labor support usually prevents the occurrence of repayment problems and explains why clients who give preference to the group-lending contract belong to groups which could be labeled 'perfect payers'. Vice versa, the absence of peer support in a group implies that each borrower has to manage his problems independently, thus increasing the probability of failure. We conclude with result 2.
Result 2: Groups with a preference for group loans show more willingness for peer support so that the probability that a group member ends up with a repayment problem is smaller than for groups where the borrowers preferred an individual lending scheme.
It is also interesting to analyze whether the willingness to provide peer support changes over the course of time when, according to the empirical evidence of Paxton [1996] , more and more problems are expected to occur (due to a potential mismatching). We measured the sensitivity of group support to the loan cycle by separately applying the econometric model to two sub-samples of borrowers, the first one with three or less loans and the second one with more than three loans. Peer support is statistically significant only in the second sub-sample. We may conclude that group support grows stronger in the course of time. The longer borrowers stay in a group, the higher their mutual trust, and the better they cooperate. This finding gives evidence to the viability of group lending and its ability to generate high repayment rates over a relatively long period of time. The results presented here are different to those of Paxton's (1996) investigation with respect to the mismatching problem. We will return to this contradicting evidence in the next section.
Peer control (PC) is the second significant variable. Its coefficient surprisingly exhibits a negative sign. To interpret this result, we assert that for most of Constanta's borrowers, the exchange of business information is more a corrective measure than a preventive one 16 .
Result 3:
The more repayment difficulties arise in a group, the more intensive the intragroup exchange. At the MFI Constanta, the real state of the investments is verified if one group member declares inability to repay. Peer control, then, accounts for the borrowers auditing effort, where the business conditions of the delinquent peers are analyzed.
External Repayment Performance
15 Borrowers, who faced health problems, for example, reported that their peers mostly offered temporary labor support. It should be emphasized that this behavior is an economically well-calculated act. For lowincome clients, it is more profitable to invest additional labor, ensuring prompt repayment by the disabled person, than to use own financial means to cover his part of the debt. 16 In this context it is worth noting that we revealed different client behavior in a similar survey (cf. Kritikos and Vigenina [2003] ) carried out at the MFI FORA (Russia). Controlling, being significant and positive, proved to be a predictive variable rather than a reactive one. FORA's clients effectively used the meetings to control their peers and to assure that the latter did not misallocate the borrowed capital. This indicates that the timing of peer measures depends on the cultural idiosyncrasies of each country.
Internal delinquency is an intra-group problem and does not affect the lender. If a group cooperates effectively, the MFI is usually not aware of all cases of internal delinquency because borrowers driven by the incentive mechanism may solve the problems within the group and may promptly repay the entire group's loan amount. By employing now equation (3), we analyze the impact of joint-liability contracts on groups which were not able to pay the weekly installments on time (qu. 19). In our sample the repayment schedule was violated by around 10% of the groups. Table 6 presents the estimates of the applied multinominal logit model. Column (1) reveals the variables differentiating between 'perfect payers' and 'defaulters', whereas Column (2) compares ‚defaulters' with those groups whose members solved their internal repayment problems independently. By doing so we are able to reveal which variable affects the occurrence of external problems given that internal problems between the group members have been observed. From the statistical properties of the variables group quality, peer pressure, and staff pressure we may conclude that the members of the groups, which are most likely to promptly fulfill their repayment obligations, run safer businesses, exert stronger pressure on delinquent partners, and communicate more often with the loan officers. At the same time, the negative coefficient of business correlation points to the probably most serious repayment problem in Constanta, namely the high vulnerability to external shocks of groups in which the investment returns across borrowers proved to be positively correlated.
-insert Table 6 about hereWe start the interpretation with the variable peer pressure (PP). It is significant in both cases, indicating that the probability of default is considerably smaller for groups whose members impose or threatened to impose social sanctions.
Result 4:
Peer pressure significantly improves the external repayment but does not influence the internal repayment performance indicating that most borrowers of Constanta exert peer pressure only if a repayment problem has occurred. The result is confirmed by the negative sign of the peer control variable in Column (1).
We may conclude that within the group-lending mechanism for the borrowers of Constanta the central variable preventing internal delinquency is peer support (as shown in result 2). All other peer measures are used by the borrowers as corrective measures, then solving the MFI´s enforcement problem.
A further crucial factor is the self-selection process. While the borrower's risk type showed to be not significant for the improvement of the internal repayment performance (Table 5) , the significance of the group quality variable (Table 6) indicates that groups consisting of higher-risk borrowers are more likely to be delinquent than groups formed by low-risk clients. Repayment difficulties made it then necessary that peers and loan officers exert pressure upon the delinquent borrowers to make them repay their overdue rates. Thus, higher risk groups were less able to solve their repayment problems internally.
Result 5: Even though higher-risk borrowers did not default more often than low-risk clients, in case of delinquency higher risk borrowers were less able to employ support measures for solving repayment problems internally before a rate is due. Instead peer pressure was mostly necessary to ensure a delayed repayment of the loan rates.
Column (2) reveals further support with respect to this finding. Focusing on the role of the loan officers and their influence on the group dynamics, we observe that most of the groups who experienced internal repayment problems but successfully solved them had been more intensively monitored by the loan officers. A further interesting finding can be derived from a comparison of the statistical characteristics of the variables group quality and social ties. Group quality specifies the members' business characteristics whereas social ties measures the homogeneity of the group in terms to several demographic and social factors. The significance of the former and the insignificance of the latter indicate that the lender's repayment performance can be improved only if clients build groups of similar investment risks. Other group characteristics have no impact. These results are similar to the findings of Wydick (1999) where social ties proved to have no (or a negative) effect on borrowing group behavior.
The variable business correlation (CORR) measures the degree of interdependence across members' businesses. The a priori expectations about this variable are ambiguous, since one has to take the negative consequences of bad risk diversification into account as well as the potentially positive consequences if the borrowers monitor each other in a better way (see Footnote 13). In Constanta's case the variable negatively affects the expected return of the lender:
Result 7: (1) An increase in the (scale of) business correlation significantly raises the probability that all group members will suffer the same negative shock, then leading to more delinquencies. (2) Regressing the business correlation variable on monitoring shows the coefficient to be insignificant (with a p-value of 0.698), indicating that peers with highly correlated businesses do not intensify their monitoring efforts in order to avoid paying the debts of their partners.
Testing the Influence of Further Variables
In the final subsection, we aim to analyze two further variables often discussed in the context of group loans, namely dynamic incentives and gender aspects.
Result 8:
In contrast to the general expectations raised in theoretical models the variable dynamic incentives does neither affect the internal nor the external repayment performance of the borrowers of Constanta.
An explanation for this surprising result is that Constanta's clients, having small, and only occasionally developing businesses, were not in need of a stream of increasingly larger loans. To test for reliability we checked whether there is any correlation between the dynamics of a borrower's business (qu. 3) and his demand for increasing loans (qu. 15.1). We computed a Spearman's non-parametric test (Table 7) showing that the two variables are positively correlated (at .05 significance level). The more dynamic the development of the business project the higher the borrower values the opportunity to obtain subsequent loans of higher volume. After the first three to four loan cycles, however, many of Constanta's clients voluntarily refuse to further increase the borrowed amount, showing that access to subsequent loans is a central issue, while increasing loan size is not.
-insert Table 7 about hereSome credit programs like those of the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) explicitly target women, which suggests that under the joint-liability mechanism women are better borrowers then men because in these countries they have a better developed sense of group solidarity (cf. Bernasek and Stanfield [1997] ).
Others (cf. e.g. Rahman [1998] or Kritikos and Bolle [2000] ) argue that there are differing reasons (although highly correlated with gender aspects) for the better repayment behaviour of this target group, such as fewer borrowing possibilities or greater responsibility towards the family. In 1997, Constanta offered loans only to women, but soon abandoned this practice and successfully expanded its activities to male borrowers.
The empirical data show that women do not outperform men.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The aim of this study is to investigate the complete dynamics of micro-lending technologies making use of joint-liability. The empirical results enable us to explain several puzzles of the micro-finance paradigm. The first puzzle focuses on the impact of joint-liability contracts on the behavior of borrowers before and after signing the contract.
Starting with the hypothesis of assortative matching, the empirical results support the theoretical proposition that better-risk borrowers indeed team up with better risk borrowers (and vice versa) by making use of local information which is either costly or impossible for the lender to obtain. Based on the repayment performance of all borrowers, it seems that the MFI Constanta was also successful in meeting the second hypothesis of assortative matching: As a result of the borrowers' self-selection and the additional screening efforts of the loan officers, the potential borrowers with bad risk characteristics did not apply for this kind of loan contract. Virtually all borrowing groups repaid their loans, also confirming the hypothesis that the incentive mechanism supports efficient self-selection.
There is one exception to the positive result. As the variable external repayment performance showed, the somehow riskier borrowers created due to their higher delinquency rate higher cost for the MFI than the low risk borrowers. Loan officers had to take additional measures to make sure that all borrowers are going to repay their overdue loans. This result shows that a cost-effective MFI should not only try to be restrict its offers towards groups where the MFI may expect a full repayment (as a result of the selfselection of the groups), but should also restrict its offers to borrowers where the expected marginal enforcement cost is lower than the expected marginal revenue of the group. Moreover, the example of Constanta made clear that an MFI employing group lending schemes needs to take care for the business correlation between the group members.
Focusing on the clients' behavior after the contract signature, it is obvious that there exist sufficient individual incentives for each group member to repay his loan as long as the development of his business enables him to do so. Strategic defaults were not a serious problem. Moreover, there was no incidence of excessive monitoring: borrowers had not experienced pressure from their peers to invest only in certain kind of projects.
Whenever repayment problems were created (e.g. by external influences), the incentive system did, in fact, cause mutual activities. At the MFI Constanta, peer support grows stronger over time, giving evidence that the group-lending mechanism is able to generate repayments over a long period, in particular when the group members prefer joint-liability to other schemes. Peer pressure and controlling are used by borrowers mainly as corrective measures and help the MFI solve the enforcement problem. 17 Let us turn to the second puzzle. In theoretical papers, it is emphasized that the jointliability contract leads to an efficient self-selection and to peer measures so that almost all problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are solved by the borrowers themselves. The empirical results of the present paper support the existence of such mutual exchange.
At the same time several micro-lending practitioners claim that high repayment rates occur only because of the activities of loan officers, while suggesting that joint-liability with the consequences described above "is not practiced" (cf. e.g. Jain [1995] ).
Indeed, in most theoretical models, the screening, monitoring and enforcement efforts of lenders are not explicitly considered. In practice, as emphasized in section 2, each lending organization spends money, time and effort in the process of group building by meeting the groups for the purposes of explaining the principles of the mechanism, and by seeking out further information about the borrowers. Hence, the screening costs are not zero and affect the overall quality of the lender's portfolio. As further emphasized, loan officers show their presence by making random visits to the borrowers' sites after the loan disbursement and, in particular, by making immediate visits in case of delinquency. These observations seemingly allow for the assertion that it is mainly due to the loan officers´ activities that MFIs encouter low default rates.
Our empirical analysis, however, allows for the conclusion that the activities of the loan officers have a rather complementary effect on the efficacy of the mechanism. The screening process is complementary in the sense that the loan officers allow for deliberate grouping. Rather than undertaking any supportive activities with respect to group building, they take restrictive measures towards the freshly created borrower group. The loan repayment performance will be better, if the loan officers ensure that i) there are not too many "rich" borrowers in the group (who are not sensitive to the non-refinancing threats), ii) the loan sizes are not too high in relation to the expected cash flow of the borrowers (so that they can cover missing installments in case of delinquency), and iii) the business correlation is not too high. Lastly, if an applying group seems to contain excessive risks, the loan officer should not give access to a group loan. 18 The monitoring and enforcement process is complementary in the sense that the loan officers contact the group on the first day it is in arrears, and make sure that it finds immediate solutions to the repayment problem by threatening to use the known sanctions of the joint-liability approach. Thus, one reason the loan officer has to act is that the group needs to be reminded of the rewards at stake to induce the expected peer measures. The second reason for direct action is that the probability that a delinquent borrower will be able to "save" his business from insolvency is higher the earlier he and/or his peers take the appropriate measures for a positive turn-around of the business (See e.g. Evers et al. [2000] ). In short, the loan officers, by making active and immediate use of the "letter of the law", induce borrowers to solve their repayment problems by taking peer measures. Thus, our answer to the second puzzle is: The mechanism performs as described in theory, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties.
The third puzzle focuses on the surprising result that the variable dynamic incentives, which proved to have no direct impact on the repayment performance at the MFI Constanta. This puzzle can be solved if a further factor is taken into account, namely the long term development of borrowers in a group.
We suggest that there are two typical forms of long-term development of borrower groups.
As suggested in recent research (Lazear [2003] and Kritikos and Wießner [2004] ), we differentiate between entrepreneurs who are characterized by their skills and abilities in the decision process of developing a business project. Depending on their skills, there might be entrepreneurs who are able to plan a business of increasing size (to be classified as dynamic business). And there might be entrepreneurs who are planing -due to their lower skills -a business with less or no dynamic perspective (to be classified as static business).
Entrepreneurs who formed groups of dynamic investments respond positively to dynamic incentives. However, after some loan periods, due to the more dynamic investments they have a higher probability of running into a long term mismatching problem which cannot be foreseen by the potential group members during the process of their group building. This mismatching problem may lead to differing outcomes. At best, borrowers may require different loan volumes. At worst, some of the businesses in a group may suffer losses, while others are able to gain high profits leading to severe delinquency problems. A domino effect may be unleashed, according to which some defaulters in the group may encourage those borrowers, who have a good performance, to decide for default, as well. The probability that such a group will run into repayment default will increase over time.
The second investment type concerns a group formed to make investments with low development prospects. Such groups need access to further loans (and feel sanctioned from the threat of exclusion), but do only initially -during the first loan periods -respond to dynamic incentives. Over the course of loan periods, due to their relatively static but safe investments, they have no mismatching problems. Borrowers will require similar loan amounts and the probability of having one group member with a high profits and another one with high losses can be neglected. If these borrowers deliberately chose this kind of contract, they will be willing to provide peer support. The probability that a complete group such as this will run into a repayment problem decreases over time.
Since it is in the interest of MFIs to minimize the probability of a domino effect, it is advisable to restrict the variable 'dynamic incentives' in group-lending methodologies. Thus, long-term prospects within group loans should only be given to investments with low development perspectives. Borrowers with more dynamic investments who start their project by making use of group loans will try to switch to individual credit offers if they are in need of higher loans and if they have enough assets to act as collateral.
In conclusion, to put the three pieces of the puzzle together, the current survey shows that joint-liability loan contracts will lead to high repayment rates, if the incentive mechanism is constructed in a way as to induce an efficient self-selection and peer measures in case of delinquency problems, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties (i.e. restrictive measures towards new groups and immediate reactions in case of delinquency to ensure the just-mentioned peer measures), and if the dynamic incentives are restricted. Last but not least, if the MFI is able to attract borrowers who prefer group to individual lending (e.g. by offering both kind of contracts) the monitoring and enforcement cost of the MFI will be minimized due to the increasing willingness among the borrowers for peer support. 
APPENDIX B
The variables peer pressure and dynamic incentives enter the model as factor analysis scores. The factors were extracted by applying the confirmatory factor analysis (also called principle axis factoring).
The initial and the extracted communalities of all initial variables are listed in Table 8 . The prior expectations were that variables group pressure, sanctions imposed by the group on delinquent peer, and sanctions imposed by the MFI on defaulting groups (questions 11, 12, and 13, App. A) would load on a factor labeled as peer pressure, whereas variables ever-increasing loans, lower interest rates, longer terms to maturity, and lower transaction costs (questions 15_1, 15_2, 15_3, 15_4, App. A) would load on a factor called dynamic incentives. The results of the analysis are presented in the tables below: Table 9 provides some measures of the appropriateness of the factor analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity indicates the statistical probability that the correlation matrix has significant correlations among at least some of the variables. In our case the null hypothesis is accepted at more than 99% confidence level. Another index of the degree of intercorrelations among the initial variables is the measure of sampling adequacy. It ranges from 0 to 1, reaching 1 when each variable is perfectly predicted without error by the other variables. With an index of .754 the sampling adequacy can by interpreted as middling.
The extracted factors explain more then 50% of the total variance (Table 10) . Taking into account the applied method of principal axis factoring 19 it can be defined as acceptable. Finally, Table 11 presents the factor loadings that have been extracted by using the Varimax Rotation Method.
Varimax rotation is an orthogonal rotation of the factor axes to maximize the variance of the squared loadings of a factor on all the variables in a factor matrix. It minimizes the number of variables, which have high loadings on any one given factor. Each factor will tend to have either large or small loadings of particular variables on it. The Rotated Factor Matrix clearly shows which variables on which factors load. It shows that the correlation between the pre-selected variables and the respective factors is sufficiently high.
